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DEPARTMENT OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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STATE-BUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE

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ATHOUR(S):

ANNE-VIOLETTE ASTRUC ZELAYA

TUTOR

NELLY VALDIVIA

nelly.valdivia@keiseruniversity.edu

SAN MARCOS, CARAZO, NICARAGUA

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the interaction between peacebuilding (PB) and state-building (SB) in post-conflict contexts through a comparative mixed-methods design that integrates quantitative governance indicators with qualitative process-tracing of peace agreement implementation. The research focuses on two long-duration conflicts: Colombia's internal warfare with the FARC-EP and Mozambique's civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The research examines why both cases achieved negotiated settlements yet experienced sharply different post-war trajectories. The methodology combines data from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) including political stability, rule of law, and government effectiveness with analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes, peace treaty provisions, and the evolution of governance legitimacy. Results show that restoration of governance legitimacy and public trust is a stronger and more robust predictor of durable peace than technical DDR measures alone.

Colombia's WGI scores improved substantially after the 2016 peace accord, particularly in rule of law and government effectiveness. These gains coincided with inclusive institutional reforms, judicial strengthening, and strategies designed to broaden civil participation as well as accountability. In contrast, Mozambique's governance indicators stagnated or declined despite formal completion of DDR activities. Persistent corruption, weak enforcement of the rule of law, and declining public confidence collectively limited the durability of peace and contributed to ongoing political fragility. Overall, the study supports the argument that context-specific, legitimacy-driven approaches to PB and SB are essential for reducing the risk of violent relapse in post-conflict environments. When DDR measures are implemented in isolation, they are insufficient to generate long-term stability. The analysis concludes that post-conflict

interventions must advance peacebuilding and state-building simultaneously. This is best achieved by prioritizing inclusive governance reforms, enhancing state responsiveness, and encouraging collaboration between different actors of the conflict, thereby strengthening institutional capacity and long-term peace.

RESUMEN

Este estudio investiga la interacción entre los procesos de paz y la construcción del Estado en contextos posconflicto mediante un diseño comparativo de métodos mixtos. La metodología integra indicadores cuantitativos de gobernanza con procesos cualitativos sobre la implementación de los acuerdos de paz. La investigación se centra en dos conflictos de larga duración: la guerra interna de Colombia con las FARC-EP y la guerra civil de Mozambique entre los partidos políticos, FRELIMO y RENAMO. El estudio examina por qué ambos casos lograron acuerdos negociados, pero experimentaron trayectorias posbélicas marcadamente distintas. La metodología combina datos de los Indicadores Mundiales de Gobernanza (WGI), incluyendo estabilidad política, estado de derecho y eficacia gubernamental, con el análisis de los procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (DDR), las disposiciones de los tratados de paz y la evolución de la legitimidad de la gobernanza. Los resultados muestran que la restauración de la legitimidad institucional y de la confianza pública es un predictor más sólido y robusto de paz duradera que las medidas técnicas de DDR por sí solas.

Los puntajes de los WGI de Colombia mejoraron sustancialmente después del acuerdo de paz del 2016, particularmente en estado de derecho y eficacia gubernamental. Estos avances coincidieron con reformas institucionales inclusivas, el fortalecimiento judicial y estrategias

diseñadas para ampliar la participación ciudadana y la rendición de cuentas. En contraste, los indicadores de gobernanza de Mozambique se estancaron o disminuyeron a pesar de la finalización formal de las actividades de DDR. La corrupción persistente, la débil aplicación del estado de derecho y la disminución de la confianza pública limitaron colectivamente la durabilidad de la paz y contribuyeron a la fragilidad política continua. En conjunto, el estudio respalda el argumento de que enfoques contextuales y orientados a la legitimidad para la PB y la SB son esenciales para reducir el riesgo de recaída violenta en entornos posconflicto. Cuando las medidas de DDR se implementan de manera aislada, resultan insuficientes para generar estabilidad a largo plazo. El análisis concluye que las intervenciones posconflicto deben avanzar simultáneamente en la construcción de paz y la construcción del Estado. Esto se logra mejor mediante la priorización de reformas de gobernanza inclusivas, el fortalecimiento de la capacidad de respuesta estatal y el fomento de la colaboración entre los distintos actores del conflicto, reforzando así la capacidad institucional y conllevando una paz sostenible.

I. INTRODUCTION

The present study focuses on assessing peace processes and state building in post-conflict societies, specifically Colombia and Mozambique. Peacebuilding addresses "the social and relational roots of conflict through reconciliation and dialogue, while state-building focuses on creating effective, accountable, and responsive institutions to govern and maintain the rule of law" (Bereketeab, 2021). Both concepts are connected because a weak state can perpetuate conflict, while social "division makes effective state governance impossible" (Bereketeab, 2021).

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) describes state-building as a process that enhances "capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations" (Kilpelainen, 2021). Peacebuilding and State Building (PBSB) must

conform to an inclusive and participatory process to be effective (Bereketeab, 2021). Peacebuilding (PB) also moves beyond merely stopping fighting (negative peace) toward a holistic, positive peace that restores social cohesion (Albert, 2008). Bereketeab emphasizes that effective PBSB must be domestic and participatory, involving all stakeholders in protracted negotiations, bargaining and consensus-building.

The Colombian case illustrates PBSB in practice through one of the most comprehensive negotiated settlements in recent history. Colombia's half-century civil war pitted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) against the state and multiple paramilitary groups, causing more than 220,000 deaths and displacing millions (Aristizábal, 2025). After several stalled talks, a four-year negotiation (2012-2016) produced the 2016 Final Peace Agreement, introducing one of the world's most ambitious Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs, alongside rural reform, political participation guarantees, and transitional justice program (Aristizábal, 2025). This agreement was fundamentally a state-building project; it sought to extend civilian institutions into marginalized territories by reconstructing local governance and encouraging citizen participation through Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET).

Between 2016 and 2017, 13,016 former FARC combatants laid down their weapons and 8,994 arms were collected, while a tripartite verification system oversaw safe-zone disarmament and the creation of the National Council for Reincorporation (Lampreia, 2025). The accord also introduced "reincorporation" terminology, guaranteed civil registration, and tied benefits to participation in transitional-justice processes, thereby strengthening legitimacy. Colombia's trajectory reflects the impact of judicial reform, rural-development funds and the Barometer Initiative for monitoring implementation on effective PB processes (Lampreia, 2025). Although

implementation has faced obstacles, it represented a major shift toward long-term peacebuilding by addressing the structural conditions that had led to the continuation of conflict for decades.

The study will compare Colombia's PBSB experience with Mozambique's post-civil war trajectory. Mozambique's conflict can be traced to post-independence political tensions, which pitted the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government against the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The 16-year civil war (1976-1992) ended with the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords, which established a DDR program that demobilized about 63,000 government troops and 30, 000 RENAMO fighters, yet many combatants remained in "presidential guard" units and weapon stockpiles persisted (Darch, 2018). The 1992 Rome General Peace Accord marked a turning point by establishing multiparty politics and one of the earliest large-scale DDR programs in Africa (Darch, 2018). The agreement sought to demobilize combatants, rebuild basic governance structures, and enable the integration of former fighters into civilian life.

Throughout the 90s, Mozambique experienced significant post-war stabilization and economic expansion. However, challenges persisted such as incomplete reintegration, centralization of power, and limited state presence in rural areas. In the context of the Cold War, the Mozambique conflict was connected to regional proxy interests, but evolved into a national-level insurgency (Regalia, 2017). A second wave of armed conflict erupted in central Mozambique (2013-2016) when Renamo's armed wing re-mobilized, prompting the 2019 Maputo Accord and a renewed DDR process that registered over 5,000 ex-combatants (Wiegink, 2024). Nevertheless, challenges persist including a slow DDR process due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the emergence of splinter groups, making the peace process ongoing.

Mozambique's conflict demonstrates the fragility of state-building efforts when governance reforms and inclusive political institutions remain only partially 'rebuilt' (Wiegink, 2024).

The research problem centers on the persistent gap between the large-scale proliferation of peace agreements and the uneven durability of their outcomes. The general objective of the study is to identify the key determinants that enhance the effectiveness of peace agreements and state-building in post-conflict societies. While dozens of DDR-centered processes have been implemented, scholars have yet to reach consensus on which institutional, political, and societal variables most reliably translate a cease-fire into lasting governance stability (Regalia, 2017). Accordingly, the study examines independent factors, including inclusion frameworks, governmental legitimacy, and governance stability to explain the divergent trajectories of post-conflict consolidation in Colombia and Mozambique. This study contributes to understanding state-building and peace processes in post-conflict societies by examining how institutional reconstruction, governance reforms, and negotiated settlements shape long-term stability. This approach strengthens understanding of how peace agreements can translate into stable political governance.

It was hypothesized (H1) that the effectiveness of DDR programs positively correlates with improvements in peacebuilding and state building outcomes, representing the most important indicator of durable peace. The alternative hypothesis (H2) states the restoration of governance legitimacy and public trust in state institutions constitutes a stronger determinant of sustainable peacebuilding and state building outcomes rather than DDR alone, by reinforcing political inclusion, accountability, and societal cohesion.

Section 2 describes the theoretical framework and reviews important literature related to the topic; Section 3 explains the case-study methodological design selected; Section 4 presents

quantitative and qualitative results; Section 5 discusses the findings and implications, and Section 6 offers the final conclusions.

II. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

The theoretical framework for this study draws on the intersection of state-building theory and peace process scholarship, emphasizing how domestic governance structures can shape sustainable peace. Foundational authors such as Francis Fukuyama (2004), Roland Paris (2004), and Elizabeth Cousens (2008) highlight post-conflict state-building is not merely the reconstruction of institutions, but the cultivation of legitimate, accountable authority capable of maintaining peace. Algerian diplomat Brahimi (2007) later argued that state-building should be the central aim of post-conflict operations, focusing on constitution-making, electoral design, reintegration and rule-of-law as core tasks.

Competing approaches such as liberal peacebuilding prioritizes institutional democratization and market reforms. The liberal-peace tradition can be traced to Locke, Bentham, and Kant, which states many early interventions, yet has been critiqued for imposing Western models and neglecting local legitimacy. More recent political-settlements literature, notably Christine Bell and Jan Pospisil (2017), reframes peace accords as "formalized political unsettlements" that institutionalize power-sharing rather than resolve underlying contestation. The present study adopts a hybrid peacebuilding model informed by governance and legitimacy theory, asserting that effective external engagement depends on its alignment with domestic political context, inclusive processes, and institutional capacity to achieve lasting stability. By applying this theoretical lens to the cases of Colombia and Mozambique, the study evaluates how internal legitimacy, local participation, and institutional resilience variables interact to determine long-term peace processes.

Early 21st-century scholarship on peacebuilding and state reconstruction largely centered on top-down, elite-driven negotiations, where conflict cessation was negotiated among the most powerful political, military, and economic leaders (Paris, 2004; Call, 2008). On the other hand, contemporary research underscores the importance of inclusion, governance legitimacy, and local ownership as essential foundations for durable peace (Carl, 2019). Together, the reviewed works illustrate a critical shift; sustainable post-conflict state-building requires the convergence of international indicators with domestic political frameworks.

During Colombia's early post-conflict period (after the 2016 Peace Accord), there were three major inclusion arenas; elite political pacts, civil-society participation and social outcomes (Carl, 2019). The authors included in the Accord Issue 28 by Conciliation Resource Review demonstrate that peace agreements grounded in broad social participation are more likely to achieve resilient outcomes. Contributors such as Bell and Lederach advance inclusion beyond mere representation, framing it as a process that shapes legitimacy, accountability, and the durability of political settlements (Carl, 2019).These insights relate to key dimensions and causal variables of the present study because sustainable peace largely depends on domestic political culture and participatory norms.

Complementing the organization's Conciliation Resource's review, Lakhdar Brahimi's "State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries" (2007) remains foundational to understanding the institutional dimension of peacebuilding. Brahimi asserts that post-conflict interventions often fail when they prioritize rapid stabilization over institutional reconstruction and governance capacity. The author explains that rebuilding viable political institutions (through constitution-making, elections, reintegration, rule-of-law) is indispensable for lasting stability and advocates for a "light-footprint" method that respects national leadership and avoids

parallel structures. In doing so, Brahimi provides theoretical grounding for assessing governance legitimacy and not simply cessation of violence as an enduring variable in post-conflict state resilience.

Rodríguez-Castellón (2024) examines Colombia's evolving DDR programs, identifying persistent gaps between security reintegration and socio-political incorporation. First-generation DDR focused on security; second-generation added community-based violence-reduction; third generation ("Paz Total") integrated socioeconomic development, political participation and host-community benefits (Rodríguez-Castellón, 2024). Despite formal progress, weak local participation continues to undermine reintegration, demonstrating the peace process's success hinges less on demobilization itself than on community-level legitimacy and trust.

Badruzaman and Vitón (2021) study Mozambique's post-civil war reconstruction process and argue for a "local turn" in peacebuilding. They demonstrate that excluding local actors in Mozambique's post-war settlements weakened social cohesion and left unresolved grievances that contributed to renewed conflict. This case complements the Colombian experience by illustrating the challenges brought about by elite-centered peace processes that neglect informal institutions and local agency. In discussing peace-building approaches, the authors address two dominant themes: a critique of the liberal, top-down peace model and a shift toward bottom-up, locally led processes, highlighting the difficulty of measuring multidimensional interventions (Gamboa-Vesga & Quijano, 2025).

Wiegink (2024) re-frames the 2013-16 Mozambique resurgence of violence between FRELIMO and RENAMO by treating RENAMO not solely as a rebel group that was demobilized, but as an "armed political party." A party that was embedded in social-economic networks, which the author names "renamobilised." Drawing on extensive ethnographic

fieldwork in Maringue, the study uncovers how former combatants remained linked to RENAMO through patron-client ties, "presidential guard" units and everyday community interactions (Wiegink, 2024) The 2019 Maputo Accord created a DDR program that registered over 5,000 RENAMO combatants, yet the process never fully disbanded the group's command structure because clandestine bases and guard units persisted, which highlights the limits of conventional demobilization strategies (Wiegink, 2024). The author argues that effective post-conflict policies must account for the intertwining of armed, political and social identities, rather than relying on narrow disarmament benchmarks. This reveals DDR programs must consider social integration strategies because wartime legacies and their roles within political or institutional spheres can hinder a transition into civilian life.

Together, these sources suggest that durable stability in post-conflict states requires (1) inclusive political processes with broad civil-society participation; (2) strong, locally adapted DDR methods that go beyond security; and (3) measurement frameworks that capture security, governance and societal resilience. Despite extensive research on post-conflict recovery, a significant gap remains in understanding how domestic governance, rather than external interventions, shape the long-term sustainability of peace processes. From the liberal peacebuilding models of Doyle and Sambanis (2006) to institutional approaches in Fukuyama (2004), existing literature privileges international frameworks and external state-building strategies. While these models demonstrate the structural requirements of peace (security, economic recovery, and governance), they often overlook how national political practices, legitimacy, and locally driven inclusion processes mediate the success or failure of these interventions.

The research puzzle addressed by this study centers on understanding why some post-conflict states (Colombia) achieve relatively stable institutions and undergo effective peace-processes while others (Mozambique) experience persistent fragility or even failure. Colombia and Mozambique are two cases with robust peace accords yet distinct outcomes. Through a comparative analysis, this study interrogates how domestic factors (inclusion, legitimacy, and governance performance) interact with external frameworks, more specifically the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Thus, the research bridges the gap between macro-level institutional theories and micro-level domestic processes of political legitimacy and social reintegration. This study integrates peace-process theory with state-building practice, generating pertinent insights and recommendations to support post-conflict transition.

III. Methodology

This study employs a mixed methods comparative design to analyze the determinants of stable governance and sustainable peace in post-conflict Colombia and Mozambique. Mixed methods were selected because quantitative measures for broad patterns and qualitative process tracing for causal pathways combined produce stronger inferences (Lamont, 2015). Using a comparative case study approach lends greater credibility to the patterns identified and reduces the risk of drawing generalizations based on a single country (Lamont, 2015). Process-tracing is another important tool, which allows for the identification of causal pathways that link governance strategies to peace outcomes. Triangulation methods are carried out to cross-reference findings from multiple data sources (i.e., quantitative indicators, qualitative documents, and contextual analysis), strengthening the validity of the conclusions drawn (ibid).

Colombia and Mozambique were selected for the study because both experienced long, protracted internal conflicts followed by negotiated peace agreements rather than outright

military victories. Each country has since faced similar post-conflict challenges including reintegration of ex-combatants, institutional reform, and contested territorial disputes while operating under different regional, cultural, and political conditions (Diaz, 2021). Comparing them allows for valuable insights into how varying governance structures and policy approaches can shape the durability of peace and the effectiveness of state-building efforts.

Colombia and Mozambique share key characteristics in the type of conflict; prolonged internal armed conflicts, negotiated peace processes, and comparable DDR and state-building challenges, yet display different post-conflict governance and reintegration outcomes. By holding these structural similarities constant, the analysis isolates the factors that account for their divergent trajectories in peace consolidation and institutional development. Hence, this study encompasses a "Most Similar Systems Design" (MSSD) because although Colombia and Mozambique differ culturally, regionally, economically, and historically, both faced civil wars and adopted peace agreements with DDR and state-building elements. Albeit extensive peace processes, the two countries display divergent outcomes in governance and institutional quality, making them a compelling comparative case to evaluate the factors behind their successes, mixed results, or the methods that led to persistent challenges.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by the World Bank were used to quantitively assess each country's governance stability level. The organization traces six aggregate indicators of governance from 1996–2023: (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, (3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law and (6) Control of Corruption (World Bank, 2024). These are relevant indicators that capture the institutional dimensions to strengthen PBSB strategies. The WGIs serve as a reliable and comparable data source for assessing how improvements in governance

quality influence the durability of peace across different national contexts. The study employs three out of the six dimensions to analyze the post-conflict setting in Mozambique and Colombia: political stability, rule of law, and government effectiveness. The variables are measured on a standardized scale from –2.5 to +2.5, where zero represents the global mean and higher values indicate stronger governance performance (World Bank, 2024). The three indicators are closely related to institutional legitimacy, political stability, and administrative capacity, which represent the factors hypothesized to affect peace durability.

The dependent variables are the degree of successful state-building and durable peace, operationalized through governance performance indicators (political stability, rule of law, and government effectiveness). The study examines three independent variables:

1. Inclusion processes, measured through the effectiveness of DDR programs using the United Nations IDDRS criteria and data from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database;

2. Governmental legitimacy including public trust in institutions, assessed through the WGIs for Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness; and

3. Governance stability, measured using the WGI Government Effectiveness dimension and data from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database.

Quantitatively, the WGI composite scores will be collected for each country over the post-conflict period, tracing governance trends from 1996 to 2024. Qualitatively, process tracing will be used within each case to examine how specific policies and actions (i.e., DDR design, inclusion measures, and institutional reforms) have influenced peace processes. This analysis draws on peace agreements, government policies, program evaluations, and peer-reviewed literature, with contextual data from sources such as the PA-X Peace Agreements Database to strengthen causal empirical analysis. In other words, the research combines quantitative

governance indicators with qualitative context from reports, government policies and academic studies. The comparative analysis will thus integrate statistical trends from the WGI indicators with case-specific causal narratives that trace how political choices, and institutional capacities shaped these outcomes over time, thereby investigating the relationship between governance quality and the durability of peace.

While the research design provides valuable insights, methodological limitations constrain the scope of analysis. The study could be strengthened by incorporating semi-structured interviews with local experts or NGO staff to validate documentary inferences. Additionally, the WGI indicators are aggregate measures that can "obscure subnational variation and introduce potential measurement errors" (World Bank Group, 2025). Establishing causality is also challenging in observational research because observed associations may result from omitted variables or reverse causation (Lamont, 2015). Without a defined statistical model, this study may not demonstrate with certainty there is a correlation between specific peace process factors (such as inclusion strategies through national dialogues) and their direct influence on state-building or the durability of peace. Instead, plausible relationships are identified through causal pathways and process tracing, supported by numerical indicators of governance effectiveness. Albeit the study's limitations, these linkages provide a foundation for future research on peace processes and state-building mechanisms aimed at improving theoretical and policy approaches.

I.V Results

Having established the methodological framework for assessing H1 and H2 through both statistical and qualitative evidence, this section reports the results. The findings draw on WGI indicators and process-tracing of important peace treaties to demonstrate how governance quality

and DDR programs influenced state-building and peace processes in Colombia and
Mozambique. As predicted, the data show that the effectiveness of disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) programs (H1) is positively associated with improvements in
peacebuilding and state building outcomes. However, it is not the most and only important
variable for effective peace processes.

As reflected in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Colombia
demonstrated gradual improvements across the three indicators. These trends correspond with
the implementation of exhaustive DDR initiatives following major peace agreements including
the 2006 AUC demobilization and the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Accord (Carl, 2019). In contrast,
Mozambique's WGI scores remained largely stagnant or declined slightly after 2010, despite the
formal DDR mechanisms established under the 1992 Rome Peace Accords and subsequent
agreements in 2019 and 2023 (Badruzman, 2021). The Political Stability and Rule of Law
indicators showed no sustained improvement over time. Therefore, the data more clearly support
H2, which states that the restoration of governance legitimacy and public trust in state
institutions constitutes a stronger determinant of sustainable peacebuilding and state-building
outcomes, rather than DDR alone.

In Colombia, sustained improvements across WGI dimensions, particularly Rule of Law
and Government Effectiveness, coincided with periods of greater political inclusion and judicial
reform. The PAX peace agreement database corroborates that inclusive governance reforms,
such as the 1991 Constitution and the 2016 Final Peace Agreement, played a central role in
reinforcing state legitimacy and public trust (Lampreia, 2025). Conversely, Mozambique's peace
agreements produced limited governance gains despite extensive DDR implementation, as
persistent corruption, weak rule of law, and low government effectiveness scores undermined

public confidence (Wiegink, 2024). The quantitative trends and peace agreement trajectories validate H2 over H1, indicating that while DDR programs contribute to immediate stabilization, enduring peacebuilding outcomes depend more substantially on the restoration of institutional legitimacy, accountability, and inclusive governance.

WGI indicators were used to assess the stability of post-conflict peace agreements and state-building efforts in Colombia and Mozambique. WGI indicators describe broad patterns in perceptions of the quality of governance across countries and over time (World Bank, 2025). These are not based on a single "citizen perception" survey, instead they are compiled from over 30 existing data sources, which include surveys of households and firms (i.e., Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer), expert assessments from business information providers, NGOs, and public sector organizations (e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, World Bank CPIA). According to the World Bank (2025), the indicators represent the following:

- Government Effectiveness: captures perceptions of the quality of public services and the degree of its independence from political pressures… and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

- Political Stability and Absence of Violence: measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.

- Rule of Law: captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.

Table 1: Colombia WGI Indicators

Year	Government Effectiveness: Estimate	Rule of Law: Estimate	Political Stability and Absence of Violence: Estimate
1996	-0.46	-0.75	-1.65
1998	-0.33	-0.66	-1.79
2000	-0.40	-0.93	-1.61
2002	-0.49	-0.75	-1.96
2003	-0.22	-0.74	-2.38
2004	-0.22	-0.70	-2.27
2005	-0.20	-0.63	-2.06
2006	-0.19	-0.51	-1.90
2007	-0.05	-0.43	-1.81
2008	-0.03	-0.38	-1.85
2009	-0.30	-0.37	-1.83
2010	-0.12	-0.27	-1.54
2011	-0.05	-0.22	-1.28
2012	0.00	-0.33	-1.40
2013	0.05	-0.39	-1.29
2014	-0.14	-0.25	-1.11
2015	-0.09	-0.25	-1.07
2016	-0.04	-0.27	-0.89
2017	-0.14	-0.37	-0.78
2018	-0.14	-0.38	-0.81
2019	0.03	-0.39	-0.98
2020	0.01	-0.49	-0.70
2021	-0.05	-0.47	-0.95
2022	0.01	-0.43	-0.63
2023	-0.08	-0.46	-0.72
Difference (1996 score) - (2023 score)	-0.38	-0.29	-0.93

Table 2: Mozambique WGI Indicators

Series Name	Government Effectiveness	Political Stability and Absence of Violence	Rule of Law: Estimate
1996	-0.14	-0.05	-0.81
1998	-0.47	0.11	-0.83
2000	-0.49	-0.13	-0.80
2002	-0.44	0.19	-0.73
2003	-0.54	0.25	-0.70
2004	-0.59	0.00	-0.68
2005	-0.54	0.13	-0.63
2006	-0.67	0.52	-0.62
2007	-0.55	0.36	-0.61
2008	-0.56	0.38	-0.62
2009	-0.60	0.63	-0.60
2010	-0.62	0.39	-0.49
2011	-0.65	0.33	-0.58
2012	-0.65	0.39	-0.60
2013	-0.64	-0.23	-0.82
2014	-0.74	-0.34	-0.81
2015	-0.83	-0.52	-0.87
2016	-0.95	-1.10	-1.08
2017	-0.96	-0.92	-1.01
2018	-0.96	-0.83	-1.07
2019	-0.91	-0.77	-1.07
2020	-0.81	-1.28	-1.08
2021	-0.80	-1.26	-1.06
2022	-0.74	-1.27	-1.02
2023	-0.72	-1.27	-1.03
Difference (1996 score) - (2023 score)	-0.57	-1.22	-0.22

General Trends (1996–2023)

Table 1 demonstrates Colombia has experienced gradual improvement in most governance indicators, especially after the mid-2000s during the demobilization of paramilitary groups and peace negotiations with the FARC. Political Stability remains the weakest dimension due to ongoing security challenges, though the peace agreement of 2016 marked a temporary improvement. Regulatory Quality is Colombia's strongest dimension. Table 2 indicates Mozambique initially improved their scores during the early post-civil war reconstruction (1990s–early 2000s), but experienced stagnation and decline after 2010. Scores for Government Effectiveness remain particularly low.

Table 3: Comparing Two Major Peace Treaties

| Category	Colombia: Caguán process (1998–2002)	Colombia: Final Peace Agreement in Havana (2016)	Mozambique: Rome General Peace Accords (1992)	Mozambique: Maputo Accord for Peace & National Reconciliation (2019)
Accord context	Informal/official negotiations between the Pastrana government and FARC held in the Caguán demilitarized zone (1999–2002). Intended to reach a negotiated settlement but ended without an agreement.	Negotiations (2012–2016) in Havana produced a multi-chapter Final Agreement (signed 24 Nov 2016) covering rural reform, political participation, end of conflict (ceasefire/DDR), illicit drugs, victims' transitional justice (SIVJRNR/JEP), and implementation/verification (CMPVI, MVM).	General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed 4 Oct 1992 in Rome between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO group, ending 16-year civil war. Included ONUMOZ UN mission for verification and electoral support	Signed 6 Aug 2019 by President Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade; aimed to end renewed hostilities and implement decentralization and integration measures after years of intermittent conflict (2013–2016 insurgency episodes). Key guarantors and mediators included UN envoys and external mediators

Main provisions	Ceasefire/de-escalation proposals; exploratory agenda on land, political participation and drug policy; creation of space for talks (demilitarized zone).	Rural Reform (land fund, titling, PDET territorial programs). Political participation guarantees and special districts. Bilateral definitive ceasefire phased laying down of arms, tripartite/UN verification (D+180 protocol). DDR: National Reincorporation Council, economic/social reintegration support. Victims' system: Truth Commission, Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), Unit for Missing Persons.	Immediate ceasefire and DDR of combatants. - Integration/restructuring of security forces and creation of a new national army. - Release of prisoners, reintegration measures, and UN verification (ONUMOZ). - Timetable for elections under international supervision and donor conference for reconstruction.	Definitive cessation of political/military hostilities; commitments to implement a legislative package on decentralization (new local elections and allocation of provincial/district posts); reintegration packages for demobilized RENAMO fighters; institutional and political confidence-building.
Key outcomes	Talks collapsed (2002) after mutual distrust and resumed military operations; no final agreement — conflict continued.	Concrete disarmament: thousands of combatants registered and weapons collected under MVM/UN verification; creation of JEP, Truth Commission, and PDET plans. - Partial legislative implementation and programs launched; political transition of FARC to a legal party (Comunes).	Successful cessation of large-scale hostilities; DDR carried out with ONUMOZ support; multiparty elections held (1994) under international supervision; large donor-funded reconstruction packages	Initial steps: signing of cessation agreements; some demobilization and provincial elections held as first tests; international actors (UN, mediators) provided accompaniment; donor confidence initially improved.
Successes	Helped clarify negotiating obstacles and the need for robust verification,	Comprehensive institutional design linking DDR, rural reform and transitional	Effectively ended full-scale civil war, enabled transition to electoral politics and	A credible political rapprochement symbolized by public

	sequencing and international accompaniment	justice; robust international verification and explicit gender/territorial focus. Overall results: mixed. Important structural gains, but significant implementation shortfalls that limit full consolidation of peace.	post-war reconstruction.	gestures; concrete legal/administrative commitments to decentralization that would address structural political grievances. Overall results: mixed. The Accord reduced risk of large-scale RENAMO-state conflict. but faces implementation bottlenecks and competing national security pressures.
Challenges	granting a demilitarized zone reduced state control and allowed FARC to regroup; weak mutual verification; intense domestic political backlash.	Uneven, slow territorial implementation (land distribution, public services); security vacuums in some rural areas exploited by criminal groups; political polarization (plebiscite rejection then text revision) and financing constraints.	Weak state capacity and fragile institutions made long-term reintegration and service delivery uneven; political distrust persisted; periodic flare-ups and later resurgence of RENAMO insurgency (from ~2013) revealed unresolved grievances.	Implementation difficulties in decentralization laws and allocation of positions (RENAMO complaints about top security posts), persistent local tensions, and competing security threats (insurgency in Cabo Delgado) diverting state attention and resources.

Across both countries, Table 3 compares the two major agreements that structured each peace process and highlights how their design and implementation shaped differing outcomes. In Colombia, the contrast between the failed Caguán process and the far more comprehensive 2016 Havana Accord shows a shift from exploratory, trust-deficient negotiations to a detailed institutional framework that combined DDR, transitional justice, and rural reform. In

Mozambique, the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords successfully ended large-scale hostilities and enabled an immediate transition to elections, whereas the 2019 Maputo Accord sought to resolve lingering RENAMO grievances through decentralization and renewed DDR yet faced implementation bottlenecks.

Figure 1: Colombia's WGI Scores Over Time

The data show gradual and progressive improvement across all three indicators over time, despite persistent unpredictability. Political stability exhibits the greatest number of fluctuations, with very low scores in the late 1990s and early 2000s, corresponding to the height of internal conflict and paramilitary violence. However, the data shows a steady upward trend after 2010, reflecting a reduction in armed conflict intensity. The Rule of Law and Government

Effectiveness indicators also show modest gains, with both moving closer to zero, suggesting

improved institutional capacity and governance performance, especially after 2015.

Figure 2: Mozambique's WGI Scores Over Time

Mozambique's indicators remain consistently negative, demonstrating enduring

governance challenges. Political stability fluctuates mildly yet deteriorates slightly after 2015,

which shows renewed conflict and political unrest. Rule of Law reached its lowest point around

2015–2018, coinciding with corruption scandals and economic instability. The data reveal a

stagnation or gradual erosion in governance quality, suggesting that Mozambique has struggled

to strengthen institutional frameworks over time. Overall, Colombia's negotiated settlements

generated measurable and cumulative improvements in governance stability, whereas

Mozambique's initial breakthrough achieved a durable cessation of war, but subsequent

agreements struggled to produce comparable governance gains.

V. Discussion

This study set out to test and investigate relevant factors in determining effective peace processes and state building trajectories in post-conflict Colombia and Mozambique. Inclusion frameworks, government legitimacy, and governance stability were evaluated as the main factors, through a combined approach that used WGI indicators alongside process-tracing of each conflict. The analysis shows that Colombia's WGI scores on Political Stability, Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness improve markedly after the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Accord, whereas Mozambique's scores remain flat or decline despite formal DDR measures. Together, these findings support the second hypothesis, which argues that restored legitimacy and effective governance institutions constitute a stronger determinant of long-term peace rather than DDR programs by themselves.

The quantitative evidence represented by WGI scores displays a vast difference between both countries. Colombia's Rule of Law score, which was approximately – 0.46 in the early 2000s, rises to a positive value of roughly + 0.16 by 2022. In the same period, Mozambique's corresponding indicator is around – 0.73, showing no significant upward movement (World Bank, 2023). These shifts are not isolated statistical facts because process-tracing links them to concrete policy moments. The PAX-recorded 2016 Final Peace Agreement introduced a comprehensive DDR program in Colombia alongside judicial reforms and a rural-development agenda that were directly tied to the strengthening of rule-of-law institutions (Bell, & Badanjak 2019). By contrast, Mozambique's post-war agreements, although formally establishing DDR structures, failed to embed mechanisms for political inclusion or to correct the patronage-driven civil service that represents a persistent source of corruption (University of Edinburgh, 2024).

The difference shows how the substance of peace accords, particularly the inclusion of

governance reforms, translates into measurable changes in state capacity.

These findings support, and at times challenge, the existing scholarly literature on

peacebuilding. Bell and Pospisil's "formalized political unsettlement" thesis argue that "peace

agreements are inherently unsettled, and that durability depends on the capacity of institutions to

manage this 'unsettledness'" (Pospisil, 2017). The Colombian case supports this view; the 2016

agreement deliberately created institutional "settlement points" through the establishment of a

special monitoring body, the Barometer Initiative, and by linking combatant reintegration to civil

registration, which possibly improved the Government Effectiveness dimension (Carl, 2019). On

the other hand, the Mozambican experience complicates the argument that any formal agreement

can generate stability and shows the pitfalls of elite-driven settlements (Wiegink, 2024). Despite

multiple accords, the absence of inclusive institutional clauses, such as power-sharing provisions

or guarantees for sub-national autonomy, means that the formal settlement remained largely

symbolic, which relates to Brahimi's view that PBSB efforts must embed local ownership

(Brahimi, 2007). The study therefore confirms Brahimi's emphasis on locally anchored

legitimacy while extending it; legitimacy can be empirically observed and measured through

tools like the internationally recognized WGI governance scores.

Moreover, the findings diverge from earlier liberal peace critiques that overemphasize

DDR as a technical entry point for stability. Mozambique's experience shows the limits of such

an assumption. The Rome General Peace Accords (1992), the 2019 Maputo Accord, and the

2023 revised DDR agreement all met formal DDR benchmarks, yet neither rule of law nor

government effectiveness scores improved in a sustained manner (Igreja & Skaar, 2013).

Process-tracing suggests that Mozambique's DDR programs operated largely independently of

deeper institutional reforms (Wiegink, 2024). The findings thus challenge approaches that treat DDR as a sufficient condition for peace, demonstrating that technical demobilization absent institutional change does not generate resilient stability.

The study suggests a re-orientation of IR models that currently treat DDR as an end. Future models should incorporate governance indicators as mediating variables that translate peace-agreement design into long-term stability. These findings are significant for the field of International Relations because they strengthen understandings of how peace agreements translate, or fail to translate, into stable political governance. PB should not be conceptualized as a sequence of technical steps, instead, it should be a long-term political process shaped by legitimacy, inclusion, and state capacity (Brahimi, 2007). Integrating WGI indicators with process-tracing is of great utility; quantitative trends highlight structural governance patterns, while peace agreement data reveals the mechanisms through which reforms were integrated.

The study is subject to several limitations. First, WGI aggregates national scores, masking sub-national variation that may be critical in federal systems such as Colombia, where regional implementation of reforms differs markedly (World Bank, 2024). Second, the case selection is limited to two countries, which restricts the external validity of the conclusions. Third, observational data may not fully answer questions of causality, and correlations between governance trends and peace agreement provisions may be influenced by omitted variables such as economic cycles or foreign assistance (Lamont, 2015). Finally, the numerical examples draw on the most recent WGI releases and any future revisions could alter the magnitude of the reported changes. Future research can address these gaps in several ways. Disaggregated governance data including sub-national rule-of-law scores or citizen-perception surveys, would allow scholars to test whether the national trends identified here conceal different local patterns

(Diaz, 2021). Integrating qualitative accounts from civil-society actors into the process-tracing design would also enrich the analysis of how inclusive processes are experienced on the ground, testing the "local turn" hypothesis more directly (ibid).

In sum, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the durability of peace is strongly connected to the trajectory of state-level governance indicators, which in turn are shaped by the substantive content of peace agreements. Colombia's experience shows that when DDR is embedded within a broader framework of judicial reform, civil participation and inclusive political mechanisms, governance quality improves and the risk of relapse declines. Contrarily, Mozambique's experience indicates that agreements lacking institutional depth fail to generate measurable gains in governance, leaving the state vulnerable to renewed violence. For scholars of IR, these findings are key to prove the necessity of moving beyond the binary assessment of peace agreements as either a "success" or "failure" and towards a nuanced analysis that treats governance legitimacy as a central, empirically observable outcome of PBSB processes.

VI. Conclusion

The study demonstrates that the durability of peace is strongly linked to the trajectory of state-level governance indicators, which are shaped by the substantive content and implementation of peace agreements. The comparative findings from Colombia and Mozambique reinforce the hypothesis that restored governance legitimacy and public trust constitute more powerful determinants of long-term peace rather than the execution of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs alone. While DDR remains an important technical component of post-conflict stabilization, its effectiveness is fundamentally constrained when underlying institutional weaknesses or persistent citizen mistrust remain unaddressed. Colombia's trajectory after the major 2016 accord demonstrates

how inclusive reforms such as strengthened judicial institutions, broader citizen participation, and efforts to enhance accountability, can generate measurable improvements across key WGI dimensions. These gains show the capacity of legitimacy-driven governance interventions to reduce the risk of renewed violence.

In contrast, Mozambique's stagnating or declining governance indicators, despite the formal completion of DDR benchmarks, highlight the limitations of technocratic approaches that do not sufficiently confront entrenched corruption, weak rule of law, or systemic exclusion. The comparison thus reveals that when DDR is implemented without deep institutional transformation, it is insufficient to produce resilient stability. Future analytical models of peace durability can become more reliable and predictive by incorporating governance indicators as central empirical variables rather than complementary contextual information. Doing so aligns with a broader recognition that peacebuilding must be understood as a long-term political process rooted in legitimacy, inclusion, and the development of robust state capacity. Therefore, scholars of international relations, government leaders, and international organizations should move beyond binary or overly simplified assessments of peacebuilding and state-building in post-conflict societies. Instead, they should adopt more nuanced analytical strategies that treat governance legitimacy as a primary and measurable outcome, given its critical role in shaping the road to durable peace and effective state-building in post-conflict recovery trajectories.

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Appendix A

WGI Scores and Peace Treaties

Table A1: Comparing Indicators; Political Stability and Rule of Law in Colombia

Colombia (1996-2024)

Year	Political Stability	Rule of Law
1996	≈ -0.41 (very low)	≈ -0.46
2015-2018	−0.35 → -0.34 (gradual rise)	−0.09 → -0.14
2021-2022	−0.28 → -0.36 (still negative but higher)	−0.49 → -0.43
2023-2024	−0.31 → -0.08 (closest to zero)	−0.31 → -0.22

Political Stability and Rule of Law indicators represent dimensions that act as barometers of the success or limits of post-conflict state-building. For both dimensions, Colombia's score moves steadily upward from strongly negative mid-1990s estimates toward the zero-point by 2023-24. The most noticeable jumps follow the 2016 FARC-EP peace accord, which introduced a comprehensive DDR program, rural-development funds and judicial reforms.

Table A2: Comparing Indicators; Political Stability and Rule of Law in Mozambique

Mozambique (1996-2024)

Year	Political Stability	Rule of Law
1996	≈ -0.51 (low)	≈ -0.54
2010-2015	−0.80 → -0.73 (still deep negative)	−0.92 → -0.87
2021-2022	−0.87 → -0.79 (minor gain)	−0.96 → -0.83
2023-2024	−0.83 → -0.71 (slow rise)	−0.95 → -0.82

Scores remain far below zero throughout the period, with only slight upward movement after 2015. The persistence of very low Rule of Law values signals weak judicial independence, limited enforcement, and continued dispute resolution. Political Stability stays negative because

periodic insurgencies (i.e., Cabo Delgado, 2013-2021) and fragile security sector reforms keep the threat of violence high.

Table A3: Major Peace Agreements, Colombia Timeline

Year	Agreement (key parties)	Main purpose / content	Outcome
1984-1990	Betancur-M-19 peace talks; Government of Belisario Betancur & 19th April Movement (M-19)	First negotiated settlement that offered political participation to a guerrilla group.	Partial success; led to the 1991 Constitution and M-19's transformation into a legal party, but did not end the broader conflict.
1991	Demobilization Agreements with EPL, PRT, MAQL (Gov. of Colombia & smaller guerrilla groups)	Institutional reform; inclusion of former guerrillas in political life.	Partial success – created a more inclusive legal framework, yet armed conflict continued (FARC, ELN, paramilitaries).
1994	Peace Talks Framework with ELN (Preliminary) (Gov. of Colombia & ELN)	Establish conditions for negotiations with ELN.	Limited progress; failed to achieve a ceasefire; talks resumed periodically in later years.
1998-2002	Caguán Peace Process (Gov. of Colombia & FARC-EP)	Attempt comprehensive peace, including territorial negotiations.	Process collapsed; conflict intensified; set lessons for later negotiations
2002-2006	Demobilization & Reintegration Agreement with the AUC – Government & Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)	Large-scale paramilitary disarmament and reintegration.	Mixed: many combatants demobilised, but later criminal groups (e.g., "BACRIM") re-emerged.
2012-2016	Havana peace negotiations (FARC-EP). Led to the Final Peace Agreement (Colombia-FARC-EP)	Four-year dialogue to end the 50-year civil war. Included negotiation on rural reform, political participation, justice, and DDR	Successful process: produced a final accord. FARC demobilized; monitoring missions deployed; uneven implementation.
2018	Implementation Framework (post-referendum); Government, FARC-EP, UN verification	Detailed roadmap for DDR, victim reparations, rural development.	Partial success: some programs launched, but many targets lagged.
2021-2022	ELN peace talks (Cuba); Government & National Liberation Army (ELN)	Attempt to extend the peace model to the second major insurgent group.	Ongoing / inconclusive: talks stalled; no final accord.
2022	"Paz Total" policy (Petro administration); Government, multiple armed groups (ELN, FARC-EP dissidents, etc.)	Broad security-political strategy to extend DDR and negotiations to all groups.	Early stage: still being operationalised; outcomes uncertain.
2023	Legislative inclusion of ex-combatants (Comunes party); Constitutional Court &; Congress	Guarantees political seats for former FARC members.	Partial success: seats granted but political influence limited by electoral setbacks.

Table A4: Major Peace Agreements, Mozambique Timeline

Year ▼	Agreement (key parties) ▼	Main purpose / content ▼	Outcome ▼
1974	Lusaka Accord (Portugal & FRELIMO)	End colonial war and transfer power to FRELIMO.	Mozambique becomes independent; start of conflict with RENAMO later.
1984	Nkomati Accord (Mozambique & South Africa)	End cross-border support for armed groups (RENAMO).	Reduced South African support to RENAMO; civil war continued.
1989–1990	Gabon & Kenya Mediation Rounds (FRELIMO Gov. & RENAMO)	Launch structured mediation for a political settlement.	Set groundwork for Rome negotiations.
1992	Rome General Peace Accords (Gciriri Accords): Government of Mozambique (FRELIMO) &; RENAMO	Ended a 15-year civil war, created a power-sharing government and a DDR programme.	Broad success; war stopped, multi-party elections held (1994); however, political tensions and occasional RENAMO flare-ups persisted.
1994-1995	Implementation of the Accords (Joint Monitoring Commission): FRELIMO, RENAMO, UN	Supervised demobilization, reintegration, and security-sector reform.	Mixed; most combatants demobilized, but economic reintegration lagged (derived from the same peace-process discussion).
2014	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (Gov. & RENAMO)	End fighting before elections and reintegrate fighters.	Temporary peace; tensions re-emerged.
2014-2021	Cabo Delgado insurgency response (Security agreements with Southern African Development Community) – Government & regional partners	Attempted to contain a new armed rebellion in the north-east.	Unsuccessful: insurgency continued, causing massive displacement.
2017-2018	Decentralization Reform Agreements (Gov. & RENAMO)	Increase provincial autonomy to address RENAMO's demands.	Parliamentary reforms adopted; eased political tensions.
2019	Government-Renamo National Reconciliation Agreement: Government of Mozambique &; RENAMO	Renewed power-sharing, security guarantees and a roadmap for full political integration.	Early stage / mixed – formal peace restored, but implementation of security reforms remains uneven.
2023	"Strategic Partnership" with the African Union for DDR and Gov't	Expand demobilization and reintegration mechanisms for former combatants.	Pending: programmes being designed; outcomes not yet measurable.